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Abstract
I provide initial evidence that international taxation impacts the magnitude of R&D
investments in the UK. Relying on a simple theoretical model, I show that the observed
response is consistent with the mispricing of intra-group transactions. My structural
estimates suggest that transfer prices for internally provided innovation increase by
around three percent in response to a one percentage point increase in foreign taxation.
This response is more pronounced than previous estimates of aggregate profit shifting
indicate, supporting concerns on the susceptibility of intangible assets to facilitate
profit relocation.
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1 Introduction
An increasing share of R&D activity in the UK is directed at enhancing sales in foreign
markets and provided to affiliated companies (Griffith, Miller, and O’Connell, 2010). Inter-
national taxation thus likely impacts two related decisions of innovation centers in the UK:
how much research should be provided to affiliated companies and at what price. Studies
of firm level micro data panels indicate that tax rates drive both the volume (Grubert,
2003) and the pricing (Clausing, 2003; Bernard, Jensen, and Schott, 2006) of multinational
enterprises’ internal transactions. To date, the interaction of these decisions has, however,
received little attention in empirical research.
In this paper, I show in a simple theoretical model that aggressive tax planning in-
creases the optimal investment into R&D. Using a panel dataset of 1611 UK based firms, I
investigate the sensitivity of research investments to changes in national and international
taxation. Consistent with the theoretical prediction, I find a positive marginal impact of
observable transfer mispricing on the magnitude of R&D investments. In other words, my
empirical results suggest that the level of immobile research activity in the UK is higher
than it would be if multinational enterprises (MNEs) could not leverage differences in inter-
national taxation. Research is an important driver of global productivity with significant
spill-over effects both locally and internationally (Hall et al., 2009). An increased spending
on R&D may thus at least partly offset the welfare losses associated with an eroding tax
base.
The findings presented in this paper relate to earlier work by Becker and Riedel (2012),
showing that corporate taxation at the parent level drives the investment decision of for-
eign subsidiaries. Specifically, the authors identify two transmission channels, the use of
a common input and profit shifting, through which a tax externality can emerge.1 Their
empirical results indicate that profit shifting increases capital investment. Expanding on
this initial observation, I show that a similar mechanism exists for investments into R&D.
Given some flexibility in the setting of internal prices, R&D activity serves a double pur-
pose: to enhance foreign sales and to lower the group’s effective tax rate. Due to the
additional return, the optimal investment into R&D increases.
In order to quantify the implied price manipulations, I draw on prior work which
assumes that the (unobservable) marginal costs of profit shifting are proportional to the
1In an earlier version of the paper, Becker and Riedel show that credit constraints are another possible
reason for cross-border tax effects.
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ratio of shifted to true income (Hines and Rice, 1994; Huizinga and Laeven, 2008). This
cost specification suggests that the marginal net return to profit shifting is a quadratic
function of the tax difference to other affiliates. A correlation between research investments
and a squared tax differential is thus indicative for the tax efficient alignment of internal
prices. My results suggest that a one percentage point increase in foreign taxation inflates
internally used prices by around 3%.
The observed response is stronger than previous estimates of aggregate profit shifting in-
dicate. In a meta-study Heckemeyer and Overesch (2013) report an average semi-elasticity
of taxable profits of around 1. Due to a lack of data, there only exists scarce direct evidence
on the manipulation of internal prices. Using monthly observations on US trade from the
International Price Program, Clausing (2003) finds that a one percentage point increase in
foreign taxation decreases (increases) the internal price of exports (imports) by roughly two
percent. Relying on the Linked/Longitudinal Firm Transactions Database, Bernard et al.
(2006) find that the export price for intra-firm transactions is, on average, between 54%
and 67% below its arm’s length equivalent. Their results suggest that a one percentage
point increase in foreign taxation reduces the gap between arm’s-length and related-party
prices by around 0.60 percent. In light of these findings, my estimates support concerns
on the susceptibility of intangible assets to facilitate profit shifting.
My work thus contributes in two related ways to the existing literature. First, I show
that international taxation and the ability to manipulate prices impacts real decisions.
Prior research has predominantly focused on intangible concepts, including reported in-
come (Hines and Rice, 1994; Huizinga and Laeven, 2008), the capital structure of the firm
(Huizinga et al., 2008) or the location of intellectual property (Griffith et al., 2014). While
of all these dynamics have important implications for policy makers, their economic impact
is potentially confined to governmental budgets. Becker and Riedel (2012) clarify that the
tax base eroding effect of profit shifting is partly compensated by the indirect effect of
an increased investment level. My results provide more granularity by illustrating how
transfer-mispricing increases the magnitude of R&D activity in the UK.
Second, I present a new strategy to quantify the magnitude of profit shifting of MNEs.
Prior work (e.g. Hines and Rice, 1994; Huizinga and Laeven, 2008; Beer and Loeprick,
2015) typically explains reported profits with a range of firm-specific variables. A residual
correlation with tax differentials is then seen as evidence for the tax-efficient manipulation
of prices. These studies hinge on the assumption that all productive factors are observable.
Otherwise, the residual correlation could be a consequence of credit constraints, the use of a
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common good across MNE groups, or internal transactions at fair value. My identification
strategy does not rely on this critical assumption. Importantly, my estimates do not suggest
that prior findings are severely biased.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the first section, I develop the
theoretical underpinnings to understand the effect of the international tax environment on
R&D investment decisions in the UK. The model allows me to derive expressions for the
domestic and foreign user costs of R&D investments. These expressions then guide my
estimation strategy in section 3. I present my empirical results in section 4, assess their
quantitative implication in section 5 and provide conclusions in section 6.
2 The optimal provision of research for foreign and domestic
markets
In this section, I consider the optimal investment and pricing decision of an MNE’s inno-
vation center seeking to maximize global after-tax profits. The innovation center’s output
stimulates sales of domestic and foreign affiliates. In order to mitigate tax arbitrage op-
portunities, transfer pricing regulations stipulate that the internal price used for these
transactions reflects the price which would prevail between independent parties.2 In prac-
tice, however, markets for comparable transaction do often not exist and the true value of
innovation provided within a group is, usually, difficult to establish.3 I thus assume that
the innovation center has some leeway in the setting of internal prices.
Modeling the investment into and pricing of research as a simultaneous decision problem
allows me to investigate the impact of price manipulations on real activity. The result of
this model are simple expressions for the user cost of research which then guide my empirical
approach in the next section. I start by describing the model’s basic structure in section
2.1. Thereafter, I discuss the innovation center’s decision problem and optimal magnitude
of research provided (2.2). Section 2.3 presents the implied user cost of research.
2.1 Firm structure and technology
The MNE group consists of the innovation center and N affiliates, one of which is, like the
innovation center, domiciled domestically. The other affiliates are located in N − 1 foreign
2The arm’s length principle is defined in Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention
3See BEPS Action 8 on hard to value intangibles.
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jurisdictions. The innovation center employs a linear technology in the domestic economy
(Country 1) to transform labor into research. A tax credit of size µ > 1 subsidizes research
expenses at a tax rate of τ1. The innovation center’s after-tax profits thus read
piIn(p,R) = [(1− τ1)p− (1− µτ1)w]R, (1)
where p is a transfer price, w is the wage rate and R is the total magnitude of research
provided.
R&D activity fosters the group’s global sales. The mechanism of how this takes place is
not clear-cut and may vary across industries. While some innovations are easily transferable
between jurisdictions (trademarks and brands), other technologies need to be adapted to
market characteristics (the recipe of food products) or are not transferable at all. I account
for this ambiguity by defining the following concave, country-specific sales functions
fi(αRi + (1− α)R), for i = 1, . . . N (2)
where fi(x) = θif(x) and f(x) is a CES-production function, Ri denotes research directed
at country i and α ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter. This sales function nests two extremes I will
focus on in my empirical strategy: R&D activity may be deemed to produce a non-rival
good, simultaneously contributing to the sales of an MNE’s operations (α = 0), or it may
create a perfectly divisible and rival intermediate input (α = 1). I will refer to these cases
as the common input and intermediate input scenario, respectively.
The MNE’s affiliates reimburse the innovation center for the service of stimulating sales.
For accounting consistency, the total amount of research received and payed for needs to
match the total amount of research produced. Responding to the variability of the sales
function, affiliate i thus pays some price for the quantity αRi + (1 − α)RN . Summing this
quantity over i gives R for all values of α.
In the absence of price manipulations, global after-tax profits read
pi(p,R) =
N∑
i=1
{
fi(αRi + (1− α)R)− p
[
αRi + (1− α)R
N
]}
(1− τ i) + piIn(p,R). (3)
where τi denotes the corporate tax rate in country i and R = (R1, . . . , RN ) is a vector of
country-specific research investments. This expression shows that the optimal distribution
and magnitude of research is clearly determined by tax rates and production possibilities.
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What is more, global profits are a linear function of the internal price used. If there were
no regulations determining this price, the MNE could, in principle, boundlessly leverage
differences in taxation.
The arm’s length principle thus stipulates that the price for internal transactions reflects
a price which would arise between independent parties. Yet, due to a lack of comparable
transactions, this principle is often difficult to enforce, giving the innovation center some
leeway in the setting of internal prices. Specifically, the MNE may set a price p deviating
from a price pˆ which is in line with transfer pricing regulations. I will refer to the latter price
as the arm’s length price. The manipulation of transfer prices comes at a cost, however.
Prior work on profit shifting (see e.g. Hines and Rice, 1994; Huizinga and Laeven, 2008)
typically assumes that related costs are proportional to the square of shifted income and
inversely proportional to true income. In the current framework, shifted income is given
by (p − pˆ)R. If the innovation center’s true profits are proportional to pˆR, an assump-
tion satisfied by the most common production functions when combined with optimizing
behavior, this cost specification translates into
C(p,R) =
1
2γ
(p− pˆ)2
pˆ
R. (4)
The parameter γ > 0 determines the overall costs of profit shifting. As γ tends to zero,
price manipulations become prohibitively expensive.
2.2 The optimal magnitude and price of research
The innovation center seeks to maximize global after-tax profits, by choosing research
investments and transfer prices, while accounting for the costs of price manipulations.
This optimization problem is summarized by:
max
p,R
piG = pi(p,R)− C(p,R) = pi(pˆ,R) + S(p,R). (5)
The second equality rewrites the MNE’s objective as the sum of two components including
the after-tax global profits in the absence of price manipulations and the net return to
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profit shifting:
S(p,R) = (p− pˆ)
N∑
i=1
[
αRi + (1− α)R
N
]
(τi − τ1)− C(p,R). (6)
This latter representation allows for a concise and intuitive description of the mechanics
of the optimal solution. Global profits in the absence of profit shifting are clearly note
affected by the choice of p. The profit-maximizing price is thus uniquely determined by
the net return to profit shifting. Specifically, the first order condition, ∂S(p,R)/∂p = 0,
implies
p− pˆ
pˆ
= γ [ατI + (1− α)τC − τ1] , where τI = 1
R
N∑
i=1
Riτi, and τC =
1
N
N∑
i=1
τi (7)
are a weighted and an unweighted average global tax rate, respectively. Accordingly, the
optimal transfer price is inflated (i.e. above its arm’s length equivalent) with the scale of
manipulation depending on the cost parameter γ, if domestic taxation is below the foreign
average.
Combining the optimal price with (4) and (6) implies two important conclusions. One
is that the net return to profit shifting is strictly increasing in the absolute tax differential.
Groups with larger differences in corporate taxation thus profit to a higher degree from
the ability to manipulate prices. The other one is that the marginal net return to profit
shifting, ∂S(p,R)∂Ri , is for a finite γ strictly positive at an optimal price. As a consequence,
the set of first order conditions for an optimal level of research directed at market i, given
by
pi(p,R)
∂Ri
= −∂S(p,R)
∂Ri
for all i, (8)
indicates that the magnitude of research directed at foreign markets is higher than it would
be in the absence of profit shifting.4 The result follows the model’s basic intuition. With
some flexibility in the setting of internal prices, the provision of foreign research serves a
double purpose: to stimulate sales in the foreign economy and to leverage differences in
taxation.
4This follows from the concavity of the profit function.
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2.3 The user cost of research
Building on the optimality conditions above, I derive explicit expressions for the user cost
of research for the common input (α = 0) and the intermediate input (α = 1) scenario.
These relations then guide my empirical strategy in the next section. In order to avoid mul-
ticollinearity and increase the accuracy of my estimates, I also derive an explicit expression
for the arm’s length price, the MNE takes as given in its decision problem.
The arm’s length principle suggests that pˆ is the price balancing the demand (supply)
for (of) research in a scenario were the affiliates are independent profit maximizers. For
consistency with the above analysis, I assume that independent innovation centers employ
the MNE’s technology. Under perfect competition in factor and product markets, a linear
production technology imposes a zero profit condition. Using equation (1), this suggests
that the equilibrium price among independent producers is given by
pˆ = w
1− µτ1
1− τ1 ≡ ρ
D. (9)
In practice, market prices do not necessarily reflect marginal production costs.5 This might
particularly be true for intangible intensive industries. Building on the above expression,
I thus consider a slightly more general definition of the arm’s length price. Specifically, I
assume that the arm’s length price is of the form pˆ = (1 + ε)ρD, where ε denotes a mark
up over marginal production costs.
By combining this price with the definition of global profits (3) and the first order
conditions above yields the following explicit expressions for the user cost of research:6
h′(R) = ρD
[
1− τC
1− τW − ε
τC − τ1
1− τW − γ(1 + ε)
1
2
(τC − τ1)2
(1− τW )
]
, (10a)
f ′i(Ri) = ρ
D
[
1− ετi − τ1
1− τi − γ(1 + ε)
1
2
(τI − τ1)2
(1− τi)
]
, for all i 6= 1. (10b)
The first line is based on the common input scenario and relates the optimal invest-
ment into research to global sales, denoted by h(R) =
∑
i θif(R). The variable τW =∑N
i=1 θiτ
i/
∑N
j=1 θj is a weighted average of global tax rates. The second line defines the
optimal investment into an intermediate input directed at enhancing sales in country i.
The equations bear two important implications. First, a correlation between research
5See Martins et al. (1996) for a survey of profit margins in the OECD.
6See Annex A for the derivation.
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expenses and foreign tax rates are not necessarily indicative of an illegal manipulation of
prices. Even if the adjustment of transfer prices is prohibitively costly (γ = 0) and com-
petition imposes a zero profit condition on MNE’s innovation centers (ε = 0), domestic
research activity remains correlated with foreign tax rates unless global tax rates are equal-
ized. Second, some flexibility in the setting of internal prices (γ > 0) unambiguously lowers
the user cost of domestic research in both scenarios considered. The optimal investment
into R&D is thus higher than it would be in the absence of profit shifting. Importantly,
these equations show that a positive correlation between research expenses and a squared
tax differential can be given a structural interpretation, indicating that the manipulation
of prices is not prohibitively costly.
3 Empirical Approach
3.1 Sample selection and descriptive statistics
My firm-level data is extracted from the ORBIS database and covers the period from 2005
to 2012. I download information on balance sheet items, the profit and loss account as
well as the group structure for all UK firms, reporting a positive value of research and
development expenses. The vast majority of the sample, comprising approximately 2500
firms, is part of a larger group. To obtain estimates of the overall group size and on the
extent of foreign operations, I identify registered group members (2175 subsidiaries and
2200 parents are associated with an ownership of more than 50%) and merge their firm-
level data with the sample of R&D performing firms. I only account for foreign subsidiaries
with unconsolidated accounts.
Table 1
Sample Selection
Step Description Firms
1. Downloaded 2,163
2. At least 2 years reported R&D expenditure 1,696
3. Ebit Margin ∈ (−1, 1), Research intensity < 1 1,611
I drop firms which report information on research expenditures for less than 2 years to
increase the accuracy of my estimates. Furthermore, I remove observations with extreme
profitability ratios (exceeding -1 or 1) and with research intensities (defined as the ratio of
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current research expenses to total assets) exceeding one. This reduces my baseline sample
to 1611 firms (see Table 1).
Table 2 presents information on the sample composition and the distribution of the main
variables. In line with prior studies (Dischinger and Riedel, 2011) I add a small constant
to the level of research expenditures in order to avoid loosing information on subsidiaries
that do not report research expenditures in a given year. On average, firms in my dataset
spend around 3.6% of their domestic turnover on R&D. Around 38% of the observations
are classified as SMEs (small or medium enterprises).7 For these firms, a higher tax credit
applies. Around 36% of the observations in my baseline sample are classified as MNEs.
Table 2
Sample descriptives
Variable Observations Min. 1st Qu. Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
R 5684 1 105 2890 1407 381000
yD 5684 17 8118 78510 48310 5364000
y 4036 86 8212 91270 49560 3E+07
ρ 5684 0,61 0,67 0,81 0,91 0,92
SME 5684 0 0 0,38 1 1
Multi 5684 0 0 0,36 1 1
s 5684 0 0 0,67 0 729
τd 5425 -0,28 0 0,03 0 0,69
τdd 5425 0 0 0.01 0 0,21
τ c 5434 -0,26 0 0,03 0 0,62
τ cc 5434 0 0 0,01 0 0,26
The descriptive statistics on the first three variables, research expenses (R), domestic (yD) and global (y)
sales, is in thousands of pounds. ρ is my measure of the domestic user cost of research investments. SME,
a dummy variable, is one for firms that are classified as a small or medium sized enterprise according to
HMRC definition. Multi takes the value of one if the observation is affiliated with foreign firms. s is the
ratio of foreign to domestic sales. The tax variables are defined in the text.
7Until August 2008, the HMRC defined small and medium enterprises (SMEs) to be companies with
fewer than 250 employees and either an annual turnover not exceeding 50 million or a balance sheet not
exceeding 43 million. Thereafter all thresholds were doubled. Under the SME scheme the rate of relief for
corporation tax purposes is 225% from April 2012 onwards. It was 150% until July 2008 and 175% until
April 2011 where it increased to 200%. Until 2009 to be eligible the SME needs to own an intellectual
property arising from R&D expenditure.
10
3.2 Estimation approach
Building on the theoretical model, my baseline regressions take two forms. For the common
input scenario, equation (10a) suggests the following regression specification:8
ln(R)it = α1yit + α2 ln(ρit) + α3τ˜
c
it + α4τ˜
cc
it + γ
′zt + νi + it, (11)
where my dependent variable, R, is reported research and development expenses, y is the
logarithm of global sales, the domestic user cost is given by ρ = (1−µτ1)/(1− τ1) and the
tax variables are calculated according to
τ˜ c =
τC − τ1
1− τW and τ˜
cc =
(τC − τ1)2
1− τW , (12)
where definitions of these variables are given above.
A straight-forward test of the intermediate input scenario requires information on the
magnitude of R&D expenses incurred by MNEs in one country, to foster sales in other
countries of operation. Unfortunately, this information is not publicly available. However,
if research directed at foreign markets is small relative to research for the domestic economy,
the available data on overall R&D expenses can be used to derive a testable regression
specification (see Hines, 1993, for a similar approach). I present details on the derivation
of my second estimating equation in Annex B:
ln(R)it = β1y
D
it + β2 ln(ρit) + β3sit + β4sitτ˜
I
it + β5sitτ˜
II
it + γ
′zt + νi + it. (13)
The variable yD denotes the logarithm of domestic sales, s is the ratio of foreign to domestic
sales and the tax variables are calculated according to
τ˜d =
1
Ni
∑
j∈Ai
τj − τ1
1− τj and τ˜
dd =
1
Ni
∑
j∈Ai
(τI − τ1)2
1− τj . (14)
where the summation is over all foreign countries, observation i operates in which amounts
to Ni countries.
The vector z controls for time-specific shocks by including GDP per capita, the unem-
ployment rate and the inflation rate. The error component allows for firm-specific fixed
effects νi. Both specifications nest a standard cost of (research) capital specification for
8See Annex B for details on the derivation.
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purely domestic firms.9 The coefficient α2 (β2) thus measures the sensitivity of research
activity to changes in the domestic production structure.10 It is expected to take a negative
sign and can be interpreted as the elasticity of substitution in global (domestic) production.
In the common input scenario, international taxation directly affects the optimal invest-
ment into R&D. The coefficient α3 reflects the legal response to a changing tax environment
while α4 is associated with the potential of manipulating internal prices. Both tax variables
are expected to decrease the user cost of research, implying positive coefficients. In the
intermediate input scenario, the impact of international taxation depends on the share of
research directed at foreign markets. The ratio of foreign to domestic sales, s, proxies for
this share. The coefficient β3 is expected to take a positive sign. Imperfect competition
suggests that the coefficient β4 is positive. Profit shifting opportunities are, again, cap-
tured by the second tax differential. If price manipulations are not prohibitively costly, β5
is expected to take a positive sign.
4 Results
4.1 Baseline results
Table 4 presents my estimation results. I investigate the absolute price sensitivity of re-
search investments in the UK with my first specification. The estimated coefficient suggests
that a one percent increase in the user cost decreases R&D activity by 0.73 percent. In the
second specification, I estimate the output-constant price effect. Since output responds to
changes in the cost structure, my finding of a partial elasticity of 0.51 for the price variable
understates the total impact of changes in user cost. Both effects are statistically signifi-
cant at the 1% and 10% level and consistent with prior results (see Hall and Van Reenen,
2000, for a summary of the literature).
In the third specification, I add employment rates, income levels, and inflation rates
as control variables at the country level to account for cost factors that are not related to
tax. The coefficients of these controls are significant and follow standard assumptions. As
employment rises, wages increase and add to the cost of research activity. GDP per capita
affects research investments positively and inflation negatively.
9In the common input scenario, τFc = τ1 for purely domestic firms. The tax variables are thus zero. In
the intermediate input scenario, the sales ratio is zero for domestic firms.
10I calculate the domestic user cost according to: ρit = (1 − µitτDit )/(1 − τDit ), where τ1it denotes the
firm-specific tax rate in year t and µit denotes a tax credit.
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In columns (4) to (7), I investigate the impact of international taxation on research
investments in the UK. The first two specifications are based on the assumption that R&D
activity produces a common input, simultaneously stimulating the sales of an MNE’s oper-
ations. In this scenario, the optimal magnitude of research activity is a function of global
sales, domestic and international tax incentives. The coefficients on the domestic user cost
and on global sales vary slightly, when compared to the previous specification. Their sum,
however, remains remarkably constant. The partial effect of the international tax variables
is, as expected, positive. The estimated coefficients are, however, not statistically signif-
icant in column (4). My theoretical model suggests that the first tax variable coefficient
captures the mark up of independent producers. Under competitive pricing, this coeffi-
cient is zero. When incorporating this restriction in specification (5), the coefficient on
the squared tax differential increases with significance at the 10% level. In line with my
predictions developed in section 2, this partial correlation provides indirect evidence on
profit shifting behavior.
Specifications (6) and (7) are based on the intuition of research expenditures financing
a perfectly divisible and rival intermediate input, most of which is provided to domestic
affiliates. In this scenario, the optimal magnitude of R&D activity is a function of domestic
sales and tax incentive, as well as the ratio of foreign to domestic sales, interacted with
foreign tax variables. The estimated coefficient on the sales ratio is positive. Holding
domestic sales constant, this suggests that more sales abroad increase research activity
in the UK, confirming the premise that a share of domestic R&D activity is directed at
enhancing sales in foreign markets. The estimated effect is, however, only barely significant
when controlling for macro economic shocks (specification 7).
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Table 3
Fixed effects OLS estimation, Years: 2005-2012
Dependent: logarithm of R&D expenses
Specification Assumptions Common Input Intermediate Input
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ln(ρ) -0.73*** -0.51* -0.62** -0.66** -0.61** -0.52** -0.62**
(0.27) (0.26) (0.29) (0.31) (0.31) (0.26) (0.29)
y 0.55*** 0.52*** 0.47*** 0.47*** 0.52*** 0.50***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06)
s 0.01 0.01*
(0.00) (0.00)
τ˜ 0.62
(0.96)
τ˜2 1.91 2.97*
(2.59) (1.80)
s:τ˜ 0.02** 0.02*
(0.01) (0.01)
s:τ˜2 0.12*** 0.12***
(0.04) (0.04)
ln(GdpPc) 0.93** 1.47*** 1.52*** 1.08**
(0.43) (0.48) (0.49) (0.43)
Inflation -0.04** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.04**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
ln(Emp) -5.76** -9.36*** -9.05*** -6.47**
(2.69) (3.46) (3.43) (2.75)
Observations 5684 5684 5585 3962 3962 5425 5335
Adj. R2 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04
Notes: *,**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. Robust standard errors in paren-
theses.
The coefficients on the tax variable interactions represent the legal and illegal response
to a changing tax environment. The coefficient on the first tax variable is positive and
significant in both specifications. As opposed to a common input scenario, I thus find
indirect evidence of a positive mark up among independent producers. Tax differences to
foreign affiliates may thus help explain variations in the magnitude of research investments
in the UK. Importantly, my model suggests that this correlation is not related to profit
shifting activity. The second coefficient on the squared tax variable, however, captures the
effect of price manipulations. It is positive and significant in both specifications; indicating
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that groups with larger tax differences spend more on R&D. Notably, the effect is not
driven by size, which is held constant by including domestic sales.
4.2 Robustness checks
I perform a series of specification and robustness checks in Table 4 below. In the first three
columns I follow a general-to-specific approach to investigate the relative performance of my
theoretical model. The first column includes all regressors of my baseline regression. The
interaction of the sales ratio with the squared tax differential is positive and significant at
the 10% level. The other tax variables and the logarithm of global sales are not significant.
In the second and third specification, I drop variables with the lowest p-value. While the
coefficient on the squared tax differential remains positive and is measured with increasing
accuracy, it does not achieve significance. Overall, this suggests that the intermediate input
scenario is a more plausible model in the context of my analysis.
In columns (4) to (7), I investigate the robustness of my results by dropping firms which
do not provide at least 4 observations on R&D expenditures. This reduces my sample by
around 50%. The result is an increase in the estimated price sensitivity to around 1.
Concurrently, the estimated partial effect of turnover decreases. The overall response to a
changing production structure, i.e. the sum of these two coefficients, is largely unaffected.
I test the robustness of the common input scenario in columns (4) and (5). The es-
timated coefficients are qualitatively similar to the baseline regression. In the first spec-
ification, both coefficients are positive and measured imprecisely. Dropping the first tax
differential reduces the standard error of the squared tax differential. In column (5), the
squared tax differential is positive and statistically significant.
Finally, with the sixth and seventh specification, I test the robustness of the intermedi-
ate input hypothesis. The coefficient on the first tax variable interaction is not significant
in column (6). This observation is consistent with the premise that the arm’s length price
reflects marginal production costs. In the following specification (7), I incorporate this re-
striction by dropping the first tax variable. This reduces the standard error on the squared
tax differential considerably. The interaction with the squared tax differential is positive
in both specification and significant at the 5% and 1% level respectively. This provides
indirect evidence for the tax efficient alignment of internal prices.
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Table 4
Fixed effects OLS estimation, Years: 2005-2012
Dependent: logarithm of R&D expenses
Test Specification Robustness
Specification assumptions Common input Intermediate input
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ln(ρ) -0.65** -0.68** -0.66** -1.05** -0.90** -0.98** -1.00**
(0.31) (0.30) (0.29) (0.45) (0.45) (0.45) (0.45)
yD 0.51*** 0.50*** 0.50*** 0.30*** 0.31*** 0.37*** 0.37***
(0.12) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
s 0.02* 0.01* 0.01* 0.03* 0.01***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00)
τ˜ 0.45 0.17 2.58
(0.99) (0.72) (1.74)
τ˜2 1.79 1.29 1.50 0.58 4.62*
(3.08) (1.88) (1.65) (3.81) (2.37)
s:τ˜ -0.09 0.02 0.02 -0.19
(0.08) (0.01) (0.01) (0.13)
s:τ˜2 0.42* 0.11** 0.11** 1.08** 0.27***
(0.21) (0.05) (0.05) (0.51) (0.08)
y 0.00
(0.10)
ln(GdpPc) 1.41*** 0.99** 1.02** 1.15* 1.83*** 1.18* 1.62**
(0.48) (0.45) (0.44) (0.64) (0.68) (0.64) (0.68)
Inflation -0.06*** -0.04** -0.04** 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
ln(Emp) -9.24*** -6.81** -6.66** -3.73 -7.31 -3.65 -8.12
(3.48) (2.87) (2.76) (4.73) (5.47) (4.73) (5.44)
Observations 3957 5335 5335 1430 1430 1926 1926
Adj. R2 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05
Notes: *,**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. Robust standard errors in paren-
theses.
5 Interpretation
The findings of my empirical analysis suggest that there is a robust, positive correlation
between research investments in the UK and the squared tax difference to intra-group
affiliates. One possible mechanism explaining this relationship is the tax efficient alignment
of transfer prices. Specifically, the assumptions outlined in section 2 imply that the net
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return to price manipulations is increasing in a squared tax differential. The estimated
partial effect thus allows for a structural interpretation. In this section, I combine the
empirical results with my theoretical model to obtain estimates for the gap between arm’s
length and internal prices as well as their sensitivity to foreign taxation.
The common input scenario provides a straight forward way to retrieve the structural
cost parameter. Specifically, when testing the model’s basic structure in specification (4)
of Table 4, the first tax variable’s coefficient is not statistically different from zero. This
suggests that arm’s length prices reflect marginal production costs. The distribution of
the second tax coefficient estimate in the following specification (5), where this restriction
is incorporated, thus comprises all information necessary to retrieve an estimate for the
structural cost parameter:11
γ̂ = 2α̂4. (15)
Combined with optimal decision making (equation (7)), this estimate suggests that transfer
prices between related parties are, on average, around 11 percent above their arm’s length
equivalent. Increasing the average foreign tax rate by one percentage point further increases
this gap by around 3 percent.12
This semi elasticity is a rough estimate for the innovation center’s semi elasticity of tax-
able profits.13 The estimated response is much larger than prior studies on aggregate profit
shifting suggest (Clausing, 2003; Bernard et al., 2006; Heckemeyer and Overesch, 2013).
However, the results correspond to the identification of intangible assets being an impor-
tant driver in the magnitude of observable profit shifting (Dischinger and Riedel, 2011;
Beer and Loeprick, 2015) and provide further support to concerns about the susceptibility
of intangible assets to facilitate income relocation.
In the intermediate input scenario, the coefficient estimate on the first tax differential
is positive (Table 4, Column (7)), suggesting that independent producers charge a mark
11I assume that σ = 1 which is not rejected by my regression results
12Substituting the coefficient estimate of specification (5) in Table 4 gives γ̂ = 5.94. The associated
standard error is 3.6. The average difference (τC − τ1) is given by 0.018, suggesting an average δ of 10.69%.
The semi-elasticity of the wedge between arm’s length and internal prices is given by ∆δ/(1 + δ). The
definition of the optimal price implies ∆δ = γN−1
N
∆τi. With an average number of foreign affiliates, (N-1),
amounting to 1.22 for the subsample of MNEs in my dataset, and ∆τi = 0.01, I obtain ∆δ = 0.033. Dividing
this by 1.1069 gives a semi-elasticity of 2.98.
13While the regression results show that research investments are increasing in foreign taxation, the effect
is small. The relative change in the innovation center’s taxable profits are thus approximated by ∆p/p,
which corresponds to the percentage change in the gap between arm’s length and internal prices.
17
up over marginal production costs. I obtain the following conditional estimate:
γ̂ =
β̂5
β̂4
2ε̂
1 + ε̂
. (16)
Identification of the structural cost parameter thus requires knowledge of ε. The regression
results suggest that independent producers charge a mark up of 3.2.14 Combined with the
first order conditions of the theoretical model, this indicates that internal prices are around
40% above their arm’s length equivalent. Increasing foreign taxation by one percentage
point further increases the internal price by around 6%.15
The point estimates in the intermediate input scenario imply an even more pronounced
response to international tax incentives. However, they are based on a mark up which
seems excessive and which is measured only imprecisely. The standard error associated
with this estimate does indeed not reject the competitive pricing hypothesis ε = 0. As a
result, the estimated price manipulation is also not significantly different from zero.
Table 5
Relative manipulation of prices
Estimates conditional on ε
Mark up (ε) 0.06 0.09 0.12
Average percentage manipulation 2.93 4.28 5.55
(1.15) (1.68) (2.18)
Semi elasticity 0.63 0.91 1.17
(0.24) (0.34) (0.44)
First line (Average percentage manipulation) gives percentage deviation of internal prices from a hypo-
thetical equilibrium price: (p − pˆ)/pˆ = γ(τi − τ1). The second line indicates the semi elasticity of the
wedge between arm’s length and internal prices: (1 + δ)−1∂(1 + δ)/∂τi. The cost parameter γ is retrieved
conditional on ε. The mean tax differential (τi − τ1) is 0.045. All values are significantly different from
zero. Standard errors are calculated with the delta method and given in parentheses.
To further investigate the intermediate input scenario, I present estimates for the per-
centage manipulation of prices conditional on plausible mark ups in Table 5.16 The first
14The model implies ε̂ = β̂4(β̂3β̂2)
−1 = 3.2
15The average difference (τ I − τ1) is 4.5% and the cost parameter estimate is γ̂I = 9.14, suggesting that
the average wedge between arm’s length and internal prices is δ = 0.4114. The semi-elasticity of internal
prices is given by ∆δ/(1 + δ) = 0.0647.
16In a separate regression (not reported in this paper), I investigate the pricing strategy of independent
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line reports the average percentage deviation of arm’s length and internal prices. Given a
mark up of 9 percent, I estimate that internal prices are, on average, around 4.3 percent
above their arm’s length equivalent. The second line indicates that this gap increases by
slightly less than 1 percent, in response to a 1 percentage point increase in the average
foreign tax rate. These estimates are consistent with prior indirect evidence on the scale
of profit shifting.
6 Conclusion
Using a panel data set of 1611 multinational and domestic firms, I investigate the sensitivity
of research investments in the UK to changes in national and international taxation. I find
a robust positive correlation between R&D expenditures and the squared tax difference to
intra-group affiliates. This findings provides indirect evidence on the tax efficient manip-
ulation of transfer prices. Blending the empirical results with a simple theoretical model
suggests that internal prices increase by three percent in response to a one-percentage point
increase in foreign taxation. Notably, my results indicate that the magnitude of immobile
R&D activity in the UK is higher than it would be if price manipulations were prohibitively
costly. While theoretical work has provided examples of why aggressive tax minimization
may be desirable from a social perspective (e.g. Hong and Smart, 2010), applied work has
largely focused on its detrimental effects.
My analysis provides an additional avenue to applied research in exploring profit shift-
ing of MNEs. Prior work has, for the most part, investigated the sensitivity of taxable
profits, rather than the sensitivity of prices. While this approach provides more direct
evidence on the scale of observable profit shifting, it rests on the important assumptions
that all productive factors are observable. Failure to account for intermediate inputs could
result in biased estimates. Importantly, my identification strategy does not presume the
observability of all input factors. The point estimates, though associated with considerable
error margins, suggest that elasticities identified in prior work are not biased downwards.
firms in my sample. By drawing on non-parametric estimation methodologies proposed by Hall et al. (1986);
Hall (1988) and extended by Roeger (1995) I find that the average mark up in my sample of independent
firms is around 9%. This finding is consistent with other estimates of the wedge between marginal revenues
and costs for UK firms (Martins et al., 1996).
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A Derivation of the user cost
Combining the first order conditions for an optimal magnitude of research directed at
market i with the definition of global profits (3) and the net return to profit shifting (4),
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(6) gives [
f ′i − pˆ
[
α+ (1− α) 1
N
]]
(1− τ1) + (1− α)
∑
j 6=i
[
f ′j − pˆ
1
N
]
(1− τj)
+(1− τ1)pˆ− (1− µτ1)w = −(p− pˆ)
[
α+
N∑
i=1
1− α
N
]
(τi − τ1) + 1
2γ
(p− pˆ)2
pˆ
(17)
Rearranging this expression, setting α = 0 and using fi = θif gives
f ′
N∑
i=1
θi(1− τi) = (1− µτ1)w − p(τC − τ1)− 1
2γ
(p− pˆ)2
pˆ
. (18)
Substituting the optimal price (7) and using h(R) =
∑
i θif yields
h′
∑
i θi(1− τi)∑
i θi
= (1− µτ1)w − pˆ(τC − τ1)− pˆ1
2
γ(τC − τ1)2. (19)
Finally, using the arm’s length price pˆ = (1+ε)ρD, where ρD = w 1−µτ11−τ1 , defining
∑
i θi(1−τi)∑
i θi
=
1−τW and rearranging gives the user cost of research for the common input scenario (10a).
For the intermediate input scenario, I set α = 1 in (17) and rearrange to get
f ′i(1− τi) = (1− µτ1)w − p(τi − τ1) +
1
2γ
(p− pˆ)2
pˆ
. (20)
Substituting the optimal price gives
f ′i(1− τi) = (1− µτ1)w − pˆ(τi − τ1)− γpˆ(τI − τ1)(τi − τ1) +
1
2
γpˆ(τI − τ1)2. (21)
Finally, using the arm’s length price pˆ = (1 + ε)ρD, approximating (τI − τ1)(τi − τ1) by
(τI − τ1)2 and rearranging gives (10b).
B Derivation of the regression specification
Country-specific sales Yi = fi(x) = θif(x) are of a CES-type and thus satisfy
f ′i(x) = θiδ
(
f(x)
x
) 1
σ
, for all i (22)
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where the elasticity of substitution between research and other factors of production is
denoted by σ ∈ [0,∞]. For the common input scenario, this implies that marginal global
sales are given by
h′ = δ
(
f(R)
R
)1/θ∑
i
θi. (23)
Taking logarithms, rearranging and substituting the user cost of research (10a) gives
ri = µi − σ ln(ρ) + σ
{[
ε
τC − τ1
1− τW + γ(1 + ε)
1
2
(τC − τ1)2
(1− τW )
]}
+ yi (24)
where µi captures constants, lower case latin letters denote the logarithm of upper case
letters, ρ = 1−µτ11−τ1 and I used 1− τC/(1− τW ) ≈ 1 and ln(1 + x) ≈ x. This relation is the
basis for my first estimating equation. When interpreting the empirical results I assume a
Cobb-Douglas specification, implying that σ = 1.
For the intermediate input scenario, note that the the first order condition for an
optimal level of domestic research implies f ′1 = ρD. Combining this with (22) yields
Ri
R1
=
Yi
Y1
(
θi
θ1
)σ (ρD
ρi
)σ
≈ Yi
Y1
(
θi
θ1
)σ (
1 + σ
ρD − ρi
ρi
)
, (25)
where ρi denotes the user cost of research in the intermediate input scenario (the right hand
side of (10b)) and the approximation is around ρD = ρi. The relative difference between
the domestic and foreign user cost of research is given by
ρD − ρi
ρi
≈ ετi − τ1
1− τi + γ(1 + ε)
1
2
(τI − τ1)2
1− τi , (26)
where I used the approximation ln(1 + x) ≈ x. Next, I assume that the magnitude of
research directed at foreign jurisdictions is approximately equal, i.e. Ri = Rf for all i 6= 1.
This implies
∑
i 6=1
Ri
R1
=
(
θf
θ1
)σ (N − 1)Yf
Y1
1 + σ
ε 1
N − 1
∑
i 6=1
τi − τ1
1− τ i + γ(1 + ε)
1
2
1
N − 1
∑
i 6=1
(τI − τ1)2
1− τ i

(27)
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Finally, combining the above expressions with ln(R) ≈ ln(R1) +
∑
i 6=1
Ri
R1
which holds for∑
i 6=1Ri/R1 small shows that the logarithm of total research and development expenses in
the intermediate input scenario may be written as
r ≈ µd − σ ln(ρ) + y1+
(N − 1)Yf
Y1
(
θf
θ1
)σ 1 + σ
ε 1
N − 1
∑
i 6=1
τi − τ1
1− τ i + γ(1 + ε)
1
2
1
N − 1
N∑
i=2
(τI − τ1)2
1− τ i

(28)
implying the estimating equation (13).
24
